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Do IPOs’ Characteristics Affect the Likelihood of Post-Offering  
Acquisitions of Entrepreneurial Firms? 
 
 
The strategy and financial economics literature have long investigated the problem of adverse 
selection between buyers and sellers in M&A markets, which can create inefficiencies and stop 
acquirers from gaining access to valuable resources and capabilities via acquisitions. In turn, the 
entrepreneurship literature has highlighted the challenges faced by entrepreneurial firms to raise 
external capital, due to the asymmetric information that separates them from prospective 
exchange partners. In this paper, we study initial public offerings and their characteristics as 
vehicles to bring these parties together in M&A. Precisely, we investigate several micro features 
of IPOs that provide signals mitigating the problems stemming from information asymmetry 
across entrepreneurial firms and acquirers. We construct hazard models that bring strong 
evidence that certain IPO characteristics can influence the likelihood of entrepreneurial firms 
attracting M&A suitors.    3
INTRODUCTION 
Despite being so commonplace, mergers and acquisitions have often failed to create 
value for acquiring firms (e.g., Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992). Amongst the several causes that have 
been associated with M&A’s poor track record, the problem of adverse selection has received a 
great deal of attention in the literature: Due to the asymmetric information that exists between 
buyers and sellers, acquirers cannot tell apart high and low quality target firms, and in turn target 
firms cannot credibly convey their true value to acquirers (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1974; 
Fishman, 1989; Eckbo, Giammarino, & Heinkel, 1990; Stiglitz, 2000; Riley, 2001; Garmaise and 
Moskowitz, 2004). The upshot of this conundrum is that oftentimes buyers overpay for the 
resources they seek, or that otherwise promising deals do not follow through because of the 
inability to reach agreeable terms by the parties engaged in the negotiation. 
We suspect that the challenges of adverse selection in acquisitions will become even 
more prevalent when the seller is an entrepreneurial venture, for a number of reasons. First, the 
value of these firms is often attached to intangibles and perceived growth opportunities, rather 
than assets in place and established business (e.g., Cooper, Dunkelberg, & Woo, 1988), which 
clearly raises the challenges of valuation borne by acquirers. Second, as the value of the 
entrepreneurial firm is tied greatly to the figure of the entrepreneur, acquirers will also have to 
discount their valuation to account for the incentives that entrepreneurs may have to pursue 
private gains, after resources have been extended to them (e.g., Barzel, 1987; Shane & Cable, 
2002; Shane & Stuart, 2002). Lastly, entrepreneurial firms often need to overcome liabilities of 
newness or smallness and gain legitimacy in their markets (e.g., Carter & Manaster, 1990; 
Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991; Podolny, 1993; Baum, 1996). In turn, these considerations can 
further exacerbate the information problem borne by acquirers, because bidders cannot rely upon   4
strong signals from the institutional context and the target’s stakeholders to evaluate the firm’s 
prospects effectively (e.g. Arrow, 1974).  
In this paper, we draw from the literature that has discussed the information asymmetry 
problem in M&A in general, as well as from the work that has examined the effects of adverse 
selection on investors considering to acquire participation in entrepreneurial firms. We propose 
that going public and structuring an IPO appropriately can help entrepreneurial firms to provide 
quality signals to prospective investors, and therefore mitigate the effects of adverse selection 
faced by acquirers in M&A. More specifically, we investigate newly-public entrepreneurial firms 
and examine whether such IPO characteristics as venture-capital backing, underwriter reputation, 
and underpricing shape the probability of acquisition of these firms. There is a substantial body 
of work discussing the information diffusion effects of initial public offerings: For instance, IPOs 
can help reduce information asymmetries through mandatory accounting disclosures and the 
aggregation of equity investors’ information in stock prices (e.g., Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993), as 
well as through the signals inherent in the firm’s ability to bear the costs of going public (Allen 
& Faulhaber, 1989), or associate with reputable venture capitalists and underwriters (e.g., Gulati 
& Higgins, 2003; Pollock, 2004). Descriptive evidence from the Italian equity markets has also 
shown that newly-public firms tend to attract M&A suitors at a greater rate than other firms (e.g., 
Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998).  
We build upon these preliminary findings and formally test the information spillover 
effects that pervade from IPO to M&A markets. Although certain key characteristics of initial 
public offerings have been associated with positive information signals available to investors 
shortly after the IPO, very little has been done to examine whether these effects permeate other 
markets. This apparent omission stands in contrast with the phenomenon of dual tracking, which   5
has become widespread in the M&A context. Dual tracking firms get taken over, or “picked off”, 
immediately after (or even during) their filing for an initial public offering (e.g., Field and 
Karpoff, 2002). As a recent example, eBay sought to acquire privately-held PayPal for some 
time, never coming to an agreement on the price. However, when PayPal went public, the two 
firms finally reached a timely consensus and the deal took place. The cases of Advertising.com, 
Borden Chemical, Brightmail, and Noveon, which were acquired when they merely filed to go 
public, also illustrate this point (Hibbard, 2004).  
We are interested in isolating the micro features of IPOs that give rise to the dual-
tracking phenomenon. Addressing this question holds the potential to yield a few contributions to 
the literature: First, it can help to provide prescriptive guidance for acquirers seeking to reduce 
the information costs surrounding the acquisition of entrepreneurial ventures. Second, it offers 
entrepreneurs direction to enhance their credibility in different market contexts, and to achieve 
resource acquisition or exit through an acquisition. Third, in more general terms, this paper 
builds on and expands recent work that has found that signals from IPOs can have ramifications 
that extend beyond the going public event (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2003). 
Lastly, our work paves the way for future studies trying to explain what determinants of IPOs 
drive the superior gains experienced by dual tracking firms vis-à-vis single tracking ones, when 
they are taken over in the M&A market (i.e., Brau & Kohers, 2005).  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Background Theory 
The problem of adverse selection in M&A is an extension of the canonical ‘lemon’s 
market’ example proposed by Akerlof (1970): When private information held by a seller   6
separates the parties to an exchange, such that the buyer cannot distinguish ‘lemons’ from high-
quality items, inefficiencies are bound to arise. Namely, given the potential incentives held by 
sellers of low-quality items to misrepresent their value, and absent warranties to certify the 
quality of the item for sale, buyers will discount their offering price, or bear the additional 
transaction costs required to bridge the information gap that separates them from sellers. In the 
M&A markets, the problem of adverse selection described above raises transaction costs for 
acquirers, thus reducing the likelihood of creating value from their acquisitions. For example, 
bidders may end up overpaying for the target resources, should they decide to bear the 
uncertainty inherent in the information asymmetry they face. Alternatively, they may structure 
the acquisition so that the target’s interest be tied to the success of the deal, by paying in stock or 
implementing a contingent earnout. However, the former creates a ‘reversed’ adverse selection 
problem, whereby the target firm may assume that the reason why they are offered equity rather 
than cash is that the bidder’s stock is overvalued (e.g., Hansen, 1987). Contingent earnouts for 
their part delay the integration of the target’s resources and introduce other sources of 
uncertainty such as the potential for moral hazard and holdup by the seller after a deal is 
consummated (e.g., Kohers & Ang, 2000; Datar, Frankel, & Wolfson, 2001). Therefore, 
although direct remedies aimed at reducing the information asymmetry between negotiating 
parties have been proposed, acquirers are often left attempting to interpret the various signals put 
forth by the target firms themselves, their stakeholders, and the broader institutional context 
(Arrow, 1974). 
Given the implications of adverse selection in M&A, it is important to investigate what 
signals might be available to acquirers to reduce the effects of this problem. In this paper we 
wish to explore acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms, because information asymmetry is likely to   7
be particularly prevalent in these deals. The entrepreneurship literature has highlighted the 
relevance of the adverse selection problem that faces external investors considering to acquire 
interest in entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Amit et al., 1990; Casson, 1995;  Shane & Cable, 2002; 
Shane & Stuart, 2002). Following this stream of work, we assume that acquisitions of 
entrepreneurial firms will be transactions in which the hazards of misrepresentation are likely to 
be manifest, since the entrepreneur’s incentives to obtain gains from private information increase 
with the magnitude of the exchange.  Furthermore, in the acquisition of many entrepreneurial 
firms, much of the value of the deal is represented by the specific capabilities held by the 
entrepreneurs themselves, which exacerbates asymmetric information as well as subsequent 
exchange hazards such as moral hazard or holdup (e.g., Shane & Cable, 2002). Therefore, given 
these risks, entrepreneurial firms and prospective bidders alike will be keen to utilize signals that 
exist to reduce the inefficiencies that result from asymmetric information in these exchanges.  
We focus on the signaling properties of IPOs and attempt to determine whether the 
information diffused through these events bring entrepreneurial firms and prospective acquirers 
together.  Milgrom and Stokey (1982) suggest that transactions between informed and 
uninformed agents will be impeded, and that the likelihood of exchange rises as the risk of 
adverse selection lessens. Our core prediction is that certain characteristics of IPOs will offer 
credible signals on the quality of issuing firms and raise the probability of M&A transactions.  
More precisely, we examine venture capitalist backing, investment bank reputation, and 
underpricing as three such key characteristics of IPOs.  The first two variables concern the 
entrepreneurial firm’s relationships with other intermediaries that figure highly in the 
institutional context of IPOs, and that can have the effect of signaling the quality of the newly-
public firm. On the other hand, underpricing provides prospective M&A bidders with   8
information relative to the operation of the equity market and its release of information on the 
issuing firm. The following section develops hypotheses relating each of these IPO features with 
the subsequent likelihood of a takeover of the issuing firms in M&A markets. 
Development of Research Hypotheses 
Venture capitalist backing.  The first IPO characteristic we investigate is whether the 
entrepreneurial firm had engaged a venture capitalist at the time of its initial public offering. The 
involvement of a venture capitalist can provide signals on the quality of an entrepreneurial firm 
in a number of ways. For example, VCs typically fund less than one percent of the proposals 
they receive (Megginson & Weiss, 1991), and this highly selective screening process can also be 
used as a useful tool for acquirers to weed out the “lemons” in M&A markets. Moreover, venture 
capitalists often do not limit themselves to providing capital for the entrepreneurial firms they 
choose to fund, but they also add directly to the quality of a firm by taking membership in its 
board of directors, assisting in the formulation and implementation of future strategies, 
contributing their network of relations, and hiring key personnel that can also advance a firm’s 
competitiveness (e.g., Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Brav & Gompers, 1997).  The presence of a 
venture capitalist therefore serves as a summary indicator for many of these attributes of 
entrepreneurial firms, which are often intangible, unobserved, or costly to evaluate. 
Some research has questioned the validity of the signal provided by the engagement of a 
VC in a firm’s IPO, arguing that these investors tend to window-dress a firm prior to its offering 
in order to maximize their payoffs after the IPO.  While some window-dressing may occur, at 
least two factors work against this behavior in general. This sort of opportunism by VCs can be 
anticipated by outside equity investors, who will then discount their valuation of the shares of the 
newly-public firm (Jain & Kini, 1995). A related issue is that venture capitalists’ repeat business   9
relies heavily on the accumulation of reputation capital. Since VCs’ conduct is monitored by 
peers, underwriters and the broader investment community, their incentives to behave 
opportunistically will be curbed or greatly reduced (e.g., Gompers, 1996).  The above 
considerations suggest that VC backing constitutes a potentially valuable signal for mitigating 
the problems posed by asymmetric information in the acquisition of entrepreneurial firms, and 
therefore we predict that VC backing will be positively associated with the likelihood of a post-
IPO acquisition:  
Hypothesis 1:  The likelihood of an acquisition of an entrepreneurial firm following its IPO will 
be greater for venture-backed firms than for firms without VC backing. 
 
Investment bank reputation.  The second IPO characteristic we investigate is whether 
the newly public firm retained the services of a highly reputable lead underwriter at the time of 
its offering. Association with a quality underwriter has been shown to offer signals on the 
entrepreneurial firm’s value, and therefore, we propose, ease the hurdles of information 
asymmetry faced by acquirers. Paralleling the previous discussion on venture capitalists, 
investment banks’ repeat business turns upon their reputation, and as a consequence, they must 
be highly selective of the clients they choose to represent (e.g., Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Carter & 
Manaster, 1990). The most reputable investment banks are also apt to be the most cautious about 
taking public issuers that pose any risk to their reputational capital. Thus, as in the case of 
venture capitalist backing, the involvement of the best financial institutions can be thought of as 
prima facie certification of the quality of the issuing firm (e.g., Carter & Manaster, 1990; Gulati 
& Higgins, 2003). 
Following the reasoning above, to the extent that the information asymmetry between 
entrepreneurial firms and prospective investors can create inefficiencies and reduce the 
likelihood of a successful transaction (e.g., Amit et al., 1990), and to the extent that the   10
endorsement of highly reputable investment banks constitutes a signal of quality of the 
entrepreneurial firm, we expect that those ventures whose IPOs were underwritten by leading 
financial institutions will experience a greater incidence of acquisition activity after they 
complete their initial public offering: 
Hypothesis 2:  The likelihood of an acquisition of an entrepreneurial firm following its IPO will 
be positively associated with the reputation of the underwriter subscribing the 
offering. 
 
Underpricing.  Aside from the signaling properties embedded in the certification of 
issuers by venture capitalists and investment banks, we also wish to test whether the signals tied 
directly to the functioning of equity markets spill over to the M&A market and ease the due 
diligence process and the negotiation challenges of these transactions.  Prior work has noted that 
by discounting share prices at the time of their initial public offering, or underpricing, issuers 
have an opportunity to signal the quality of their firm to outsiders (e.g., Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; 
Welch, 1989). The economic intuition that leads to this conclusion is that low-quality firms will 
find it too costly to produce an information signal by means of underpricing, because once their 
true value is revealed, they will no longer gain from a transaction. On the other hand, although 
high-quality firms will also bear the costs of the signal and therefore will be worse off than in a 
world in which no information asymmetry existed, they will receive the fair value for their firms, 
whereas this outcome would not result absent the underpricing signal (Ibbotson, 1975). 
An extension of this logic to M&A or other markets seems plausible. For instance, recent 
evidence from related work suggests that the information produced from underpricing spills over 
into product markets and shapes firms’ competitive outcomes (Demers & Lewellen, 2003).  In 
the specific case of an acquisition of an entrepreneurial firm, the problem at hand is the 
inefficiencies prospective acquirers face in separating higher quality firms from others. Inasmuch   11
as underpricing offers high quality firms an opportunity to produce a signal that cannot be 
replicated by low quality firms, this information can be utilized by prospective bidders in their 
efforts to select and value target firms. Put differently, underpricing is likely to reflect many 
factors surrounding an IPO, yet high-quality entrepreneurial firms are better positioned to absorb 
this cost and even bear it intentionally, so this signal serves to enhance these firms’ credibility in 
related investment contexts such as the M&A market.  We therefore predict: 
Hypothesis 3:  The likelihood of an acquisition of an entrepreneurial firm following its IPO will 
be positively associated with the underpricing of the IPO. 
 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
The data we used for the analyses were drawn from the Security Data Corporation (SDC) 
database. SDC offers detailed firm- and transaction-level data on firms’ IPO and M&A activities, 
and this database is a standard source of information in the literature. We began assembling our 
sample from a wide cross section of initial public offerings by small US firms that occurred 
between 1986 and 1999. Consistent with the definition of small firms used by prior research as 
well as the Small Business Administration (SBA), we considered a target firm as small if it had 
500 or fewer employees in the year of the IPO (e.g., Acs & Audretsch, 1987; Audretsch, 2002; 
Hulburt & Scherr, 2003).  
We then monitored these newly public firms over time in order to determine whether they 
became acquisition targets in the five-year period following their IPO. Studies in finance have 
tracked newly-public firms and their propensity to be acquired, using windows as long as ten 
years (e.g., Mikkelson, Partch, & Shah, 1997). Clearly, a tradeoff exists between using a longer 
time window versus using a shorter one: While longer periods offer the advantage of being   12
inclusive in the research design, shorter ones allow us to capture the effects of the information 
diffused through the IPO more effectively, as well as reduce the effects of other corporate events 
that may be nearly concomitant to the going public event.  In order to balance these 
considerations and to be consistent with more recent work on post-IPO acquisitions (e.g., Field 
& Karpoff, 2002), we used a five-year time window, yet similar interpretations were obtained for 
shorter or longer time frames (i.e., 3-7 years).  We excluded deals in the M&A module of the 
SDC database that were coded as buyouts, privatizations, partial acquisitions, recapitalizations, 
divestitures, carveouts, liquidations, and restructurings. We also followed those companies that 
were de-listed after their IPO due to liquidation, insolvency or bankruptcy, because these firms 
represent a special case of censored observations that must be accounted for in the estimation of 
our models. Accounting for all these sources of data and for missing observations, our sample 
spans the 19-year time window between 1986 and 2004 and it includes 1287 initial public 
offerings, of which 232, or roughly 18 percent, were subsequently acquired. 
A preliminary investigation of the data led to a few noteworthy observations: First, over 
53 percent of the aggregate IPO activity occurred in the last five years of our sample (i.e., 1995 
to 1999), with 1996 and 1999 being the most active years (roughly 15 percent of the total for 
either year). When we compared the temporal pattern of our sample of initial public offerings 
with the population of domestic IPOs occurred in the 1986–1999 time window, we found that 
they were extremely alike (i.e., r=0.90, p<0.001).  In order to gauge the representativeness of our 
data further, we compared the patterns of venture-backed as well as high-tech IPOs against the 
population of these deals, finding that they were also quite similar (i.e., r=0.95, p<0.001 and 
r=0.88, p<0.001, respectively). Appropriate Chi-square tests also confirmed the close similarities 
of these distributions (all n.s.).   13
A parallel analysis of the sub-sample of firms that were acquired after their IPO revealed 
a similar pattern, with the frequency of M&A deals steadily increasing from just over 10 percent 
in the first 6 years considered to 16 percent in 1999. Moreover, the occurrence of acquisitions 
dropped dramatically in the later part of our sample, with the years 2002-2004 together 
accounting for a mere 3.4 percent of the total. We also found evidence of similarities between the 
19 years comprising our sample of M&A and the entire Mergerstat roster of domestic 
acquisitions during the same timeframe (i.e., r=0.64, p<0.001).  
From a cross-sectional standpoint, our data on firms’ IPOs spans a broad variety of 
industries, although the manufacturing (SIC = 2000-3900) and the service sectors (SIC = 7000-
8900) together accounted for over 77 percent of the total. We excluded transactions involving 
real-estate investment trusts, investment funds, equity carveouts involving units of diversified 
firms, LBOs, and offerings by firms operating in the financial services sector.  The remaining 
sectors (agriculture, communications, construction, mining, retail, transportation, utilities and 
wholesale) comprised 23 percent of the observations.  
Model and Measures 
Specification.  The basic structure of the multivariate statistical model is as follows: 
(1)  M&A event  =  β0 + β1Target IPO venture-backed + β2Target IPO IB reputation 
 +  β3Target IPO underpricing + γControls + ε, 
 
where the dependent variable M&A event assumes a value of 1 if the focal newly public firm was 
acquired in the five years following its IPO, and zero otherwise. We adopted survival analysis 
techniques to estimate the model as this approach allows us to obtain the dual benefits of  
(1) investigating not only the likelihood of the M&A event, but also its timing relative to the 
initial public offering of the target firm; and (2) accounting for censored observations, or those 
cases in which no acquisition followed an IPO, either because the five year window expired or   14
the focal firm was delisted and thus dropped from our sample. Other ad-hoc econometric 
techniques, such as logit models with time controls or models run only on observed M&A deals 
could provide biased estimates of the covariates under these circumstances (e.g., Greene, 1997).  
The model estimation is done by method of partial likelihood using the proportional 
hazards model proposed by Cox (1972), which is the most commonly-used and robust regression 
model in survival analysis. Unlike other survival analysis methods, the Cox model does not 
require the user to indicate an underlying distribution, as its main assumption is that the hazard 
functions of firm i is a multiple of an unspecified baseline hazard function. The basic model 
assumes the following form: 
(2)  hi(t) = λ0(t)exp{β1xi1 + … + βkxik}, 
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function, and the second part of the equation is the 
exponentiated set of covariates. 
Explanatory variables.  The first theoretical variable in our model is Target IPO 
venture-backed. This measure is a dummy variable that assumes a value of one if a venture 
capitalist had direct involvement in the focal firm at the time of the initial public offering, and 
zero otherwise.  Data on this variable were provided by the New Issues Module of the SDC 
database. The second theoretical variable is the reputation of the issuer’s underwriter (i.e., Target 
IPO IB reputation). We adopted the scales initially developed by Carter and Manaster (1990) 
and Carter et al. (1998), as well as the additional rankings compiled by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). The final scores lie on a 1-9 scale, with higher values indicating the most reputable 
underwriters, and the lowest ones denoting penny-stock investment banks. Given that IPOs can 
be co-managed by more than one investment bank, we followed precedent and focused on the 
reputation of the lead underwriter (e.g., Gulati & Higgins, 2003).  Also, since ranked tables are   15
available for three distinct time windows (i.e., 1980-1984, 1985-1991, and 1992-2000), we used 
the reference period that most closely matched the year of the focal firm’s IPO. Our third 
theoretical variable is Target IPO underpricing. Consistent with prior work (e.g., Aggarwal, 
Krigman, & Womack, 2002), we computed this measure as the first-day return of the focal firm’s 
IPO (i.e., Target IPO underpricing=(Price at closing of 1
st trading day–Offer price)/Offer price).  
Data on the stock prices used to construct this measure were collected from the SDC database. 
 Control  variables.  Besides the theoretical variables described above, we have also 
included a number of other controls that might be related to theoretical covariates and the 
likelihood of a post-IPO acquisition. First, we controlled for the stock market upon which the 
shares of the issuer were listed.  Listing on exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) or NASDAQ can enhance the firm’s visibility, and exchanges also differ markedly in 
the listing requirements imposed on firms (e.g., Draho, 2004).  For example, the NYSE requires 
that all its listed companies trade at no less than $1 per share, and that their market capitalization 
be no less than $50 million. NASDAQ poses identical requirements insofar as the stock price, 
but it only demands a minimum capitalization of $1.1 million. Major stock exchanges such as the 
NYSE or NASDAQ also impose administrative fees and regulatory restrictions on their 
companies, such as heightened expectations regarding corporate responsibility, conflict of 
interests, auditing, etc., whereas over-the-counter markets (OTC) often have no requirements at 
all.  Target IPO major exchange takes on a value of 1 if the focal firm’s IPO had been issued 
either on the NYSE or NASDAQ, and zero otherwise, using data provided by the SDC.   
Second, we implemented a series of controls for the focal firm’s resources, which might 
have an impact on the intermediaries with which a firm associates, its ability to bear the costs of 
underpricing, and its attractiveness as an acquisition candidate.  We incorporated a control for   16
firm size because larger firms may be easier to identify and value, and they are more likely to 
attract the services of reputable underwriters, but they also can possess greater slack resources, 
positional advantages, or market power (e.g., Hambrick, MacMillan, & Day, 1982; Scherer & 
Ross, 1990; Delacroix & Swaminathan, 1991). The Size variable was calculated based on the 
total assets of the newly-public firm at the time of its IPO. We also included a control for the 
firm’s financial leverage as a negative indicator of slack resources, which was computed as the 
ratio of the firm’s total liabilities to its total assets (i.e., Leverage).  Finally, the firm’s Tobin’s Q 
was incorporated in the model to account for its intangible assets and growth prospects 
(McGahan, 1999; Villalonga, 2004).  We followed Chung and Pruitt (1994) and approximated 
Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the firm’s market value of common stock plus the book value of 
preferred stock and debt, divided by its total assets (i.e., Market-to-book).  Data for these 
measures were obtained from SDC as well as the Compustat database. 
The final two controls address the industries in which firms reside as well as the broader 
macroeconomic environment.  We introduced a dummy variable (i.e., High-tech industry) 
assuming a value of one if the focal firm operated in a high-tech sector, and zero otherwise. 
High-technology industries had been particularly active in IPOs and M&A during the latter part 
of the timeframe we considered, so we sought to account for industry features that may also 
shape the mix of IPO characteristics as well as M&A activity. We relied upon AeA’s high-
technology industry definitions to identify the 45, 4-digit SIC codes falling into the high-tech 
realm. AeA is the nation’s largest high-tech trade association, representing over 3,000 companies 
ranging from software, semiconductors, medical devices, computers, internet technology, 
advanced electronics, and telecommunications systems and services.  Finally, the variable IPO 
volume was included in the specification to account for broader, macroeconomic factors over   17
time that might influence the features of IPOs or the incidence of follow-on acquisitions. This 
variable was computed as the total number of initial public offerings in the year of the focal 
firm’s offering, using data obtained from Ibbotson, Ritter & Sindelar (1994). 
 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for the variables in the model, a correlation 
matrix, and information on the core theoretical variables based on the timing of acquisition 
events that occurred. Roughly 18 percent of the newly-public firms in our sample were acquired 
within five years from their IPO.  Approximately 47 percent of the companies were backed by 
venture capitalists. Acquired firms were backed by venture capitalists 66 percent of the time, 
whereas the incidence of venture capitalist backing drops to 43 percent for firms that were not 
acquired (χ
2 = 37.93, p<0.0001).  Further analysis revealed that while only about 39 percent of 
the newly-public firms in non high-technology industries received the support of venture 
capitalists, over 61 percent of their high-tech counterparts were backed by VCs (χ
2 = 61.18, 
p<0.001).  Moreover, the propensity by VCs to finance high-tech issuers increased over time, 
going from roughly 46 percent in 1986 to over 76 percent of the deals in 1999.  
======================= 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
======================= 
 
Turning to the investment bank reputation variable, underwriter reputation appears to be 
positively correlated with VC backing (p<0.001), which likely reflects the selectiveness of both 
types of intermediaries in taking on client companies.  The IB reputation variable is also 
positively associated with IPO underpricing (p<0.001). Although there has been some debate on 
the effects of underwriter reputation on first-day returns in IPOs, recent findings have reported a   18
positive correlation between the two (i.e., Loughran & Ritter, 2002), which is consistent with our 
bivariate result. The IB reputation variable is also associated with offerings in the high-
technology sector (p<0.001), indicating a potential industry predisposition by the most 
prestigious underwriters. Although a chi-square test confirmed that more reputable investment 
banks (i.e., those ranked 9) tended to be more apt to subscribe high-tech offerings in general (i.e., 
χ
2=17.31, p<0.001), further analysis showed that this association ceased to exist when excluding 
the years 1995 through 1999, which witnessed extremely hot high-tech IPO markets (i.e., 
χ
2=0.21, n.s.). Paralleling our earlier descriptive results on venture capitalist backing, it appears 
from Table 2 that the entrepreneurial firms that underwent an acquisition were endorsed by more 
reputable investment banks compared to firms that were not acquired (t=7.10, p<0.001).  
The underpricing variable showed an average of 27 percent, as well as a large variance 
(i.e., 56 percent). Prior evidence in finance has found that first-day returns can differ greatly 
depending on the idiosyncratic features of each deal, the level of commitment of underwriters, 
the institutional and legal environment, economic cycles, and so forth (e.g., Jenkinson & 
Ljungqvist, 2001; Draho, 2004). Therefore, it is difficult to compare the distribution of the 
underpricing of our sample with prior work that has studied IPO returns using data drawn from 
different cross sections of firms or varying time periods. However, the most comprehensive 
study we know of is by Ibbotson et al. (1994), who found that underpricing averaged 15.3 
percent for a sample of 10,626 offerings that occurred between 1960 and 1992. The higher mean 
value we report is most likely due to the recentness of our data, given the much higher 
underpricing witnessed during the “bubble” of the late 1990s, as well as the fact that we are only 
sampling small firms, for which greater underpricing might be observed owing to their higher 
risk. Table 2 indicates that underpricing levels were roughly the same for firms that were   19
subsequently acquired (31%) versus those that were not acquired (26%) (t=1.10, n.s.), but a 
breakdown of acquisitions by year indicates high levels of underpricing for firms that were 
acquired within one year of the going public event (81%) compared to other years.  This 
descriptive finding may suggest that the signaling effects of underpricing, if any, might be 
transitory, and we will explore this possibility in the subsequent multivariate analyses. 
Turning our attention to the control variables, roughly 75 percent of the firms in our 
sample issued their stock on either NYSE or NASDAQ.  Consistent with the more stringent 
listing requirements and other regulations imposed by these exchanges, firms that listed on them 
tended to be backed by venture capitalists as well as were taken public by more reputable 
underwriters (both p<0.001).  Eighty-eight percent of the firms that were acquired post-IPO were 
listed on these exchanges, whereas 73 percent of the firms that were not acquired were listed on 
these exchanges (χ
2 = 22.20 p<0.0001).  The focal firm’s size averaged $61 million in assets, 
although the median was considerably lower at roughly $32 million, suggesting positive 
skewness, which we addressed by means of a log transformation. Finally, it appears that firms 
with substantial intangible assets and growth prospects were apt to underprice more substantially 
and be situated in high-tech industries (all p<0.001). 
Tables 1 and 2 reveal several bivariate relationships between our dependent variable and 
the covariates in the model, as well as a number of interesting correlations amongst the 
explanatory measures we use. For instance, all three theoretical variables are correlated with 
each other as well as with listings on major exchanges, operation in high-tech industries, and 
firm resources (all p<0.001). The large number of bivariate relationships amongst the covariates 
highlights the importance of adopting multiple regression models in order to isolate the partial 
effects of our measures on the likelihood of post-IPO acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms, and   20
they also raise the possibility of multicollinearity concerns. In order to determine whether 
multicollinearity posed a problem, we computed variance inflation factors (VIFs), yet never 
obtained VIFs in excess of 2.3, far below the conventional cutoff value of ten (Neter, 
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). As a second check, we also calculated conditioning indices, yet 
the highest index was just above 15, far below the cutoff value of 100 typically associated with 
multicollinearity problems (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). 
Table 3 presents the multivariate results.  A baseline model consisting exclusively of the 
control variables appears in column I, and the full model appears in column II. Each model was 
significant overall (p<0.001), and the addition of the theoretical variables also represented a 
significant improvement over the baseline specification (p<0.01). It therefore appears that 
venture capitalist backing, investment bank reputation, and underpricing jointly influence the 
likelihood and timing of post-IPO acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms.  Columns III – IV offer 
some robustness checks and tests of alternative specifications that will be discussed below. 
================== 
Insert Table 3 about here 
================== 
Turning to our specific hypotheses, the results provide support for the prediction that VC-
backed IPOs are more likely to be acquired in M&A markets than their counterparts (p<0.01). 
More specifically, the hazard of being acquired for firms backed by a venture capitalist is more 
than one and a half times the hazard for firms without this characteristic (i.e., e
β = e
0.56 = 1.8). 
Further inspection of the hazard functions of the sub-samples of VC-backed firms and non-VC-
backed ones also revealed that the higher incidence of acquisitions of the former tended to 
strengthen, rather than diminish, over time.    21
Our second hypothesis stated that the reputation of the investment bank underwriting the 
IPO would provide positive informational spillovers to M&A markets such that issuers 
associated with reputable underwriters would be more likely to be acquired. We found weak 
support for H2 (p<0.10, column II).  In order to explore the relationship between the likelihood 
of a post-IPO acquisition and the quality of the underwriter of the offering further, we added a 
quadratic term to allow for potentially diminishing marginal effects of investment bank 
reputation (column III), for which there appears to be strong evidence (p<0.01).  Thus, 
investment bank reputation initially has a strong positive impact on the likelihood of post-IPO 
acquisitions (p<0.01), but this effect diminishes as underwriter prestige increases (p<0.01).  
Given that investment bank reputation and VC-backing are not only positively correlated 
but potentially offer signals on entrepreneurial firms that are substitutive in nature, we also 
examined whether investment bank reputation interacts with venture capitalist backing (see 
columns IV and V).  The findings in fact provide evidence of a negative interaction effect 
between the two types of signals (p<0.01).  Interpretation of the coefficient of the interaction 
term along with the parameters for the direct effects suggests that associations with reputable 
investment banks do not have a positive influence on the likelihood of post-IPO M&A for VC-
backed issuers, but investment bank reputation is quite important for firms that had not received 
funding from venture capitalists prior to their going public event (p<0.10).   
Our third hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between the magnitude of 
underpricing and the incidence of post-IPO acquisitions. We do not find evidence to support this 
proposition in general (see columns II-V).  In order to examine this insignificant result further, 
three additional analyses were performed.  First, since the descriptive results indicated that the 
mean level of underpricing appeared to be much greater for firms that were acquired within one   22
year from their IPOs than for the rest of the sample, we wished to check whether the effects of 
underpricing on the likelihood of acquisition were felt only in a short time period after a firm’s 
IPO. We re-estimated the model including only a one-year time window for acquisition after the 
entrepreneurial firm’s initial public offering, and we found evidence that underpricing increased 
the probability of an acquisition (p<0.01). However, this result did not hold when we stretched 
the potential event window to as little as two years, so it appears that the effects of underpricing 
are very short-lived.  Second, as for the investment bank reputation variable, we examined 
whether there is a non-linear relationship between underpricing and the likelihood of post-IPO 
M&A, but we found no evidence suggesting that the insignificant linear term is due to such 
nonlinearities. Third, we also sought to explore whether the reputation of investment banks 
might moderate the relationship between underpricing and acquisitions.  Recent work and 
anecdotal evidence have discussed a phenomenon called the “analyst lust hypothesis,” which 
states that new issuers may be willing to hire prestigious underwriters and bear higher costs in 
order to have the new issue covered by star analysts (e.g., Dunbar, 2000; Krigman, Shaw & 
Womack, 2001; Loughran & Ritter, 2004).  We did not observe any evidence of an interaction 
between underpricing and investment bank reputation in the context of post-IPO acquisitions, 
however.   
Finally, the control variables deserve some brief comment.  Of the control variables 
considered, the exchange upon which the issuer lists and whether or not the issuer comes from a 
high-tech industry appear to have an influence on the likelihood of acquisition.  Entrepreneurial 
firms that list on major exchanges such as the NYSE or NASDAQ are those that are most likely 
to be acquired after going public (p<0.01 and p<0.05 in Columns I and II, respectively).  We also 
performed a robustness check to examine whether it was appropriate to pool together issuers on   23
NYSE and those on NASDAQ, or whether these exchanges should be disaggregated in the 
models.  Re-estimation of the model with separate indicators for each exchange demonstrated 
that while the probability of a post-IPO acquisition was positively associated with issues on 
NASDAQ (p<0.05), no such a significant relationship was observed for NYSE offerings.  
Turning to our control for high-technology industries, we also found that firms situated in these 
industries were more likely to be acquired than firms in other sectors (p<0.01 in Column II).  
Other characteristics of entrepreneurial firms such as their growth prospects or financial slack 
appear to have no bearing on the likelihood of acquisition, and there is only modest evidence that 
hot IPO markets are followed by increased activity in M&A markets in general, after controlling 
for firm-specific attributes (p<0.10). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Contributions and Implications 
This paper uses signaling theory to examine the adverse selection problem experienced 
by acquirers of entrepreneurial firms and brings evidence of the information spillovers that 
extend from the IPO setting into M&A markets. Our results help to pinpoint particular IPO 
characteristics that have an impact on the incidence of subsequent acquisitions of newly-public 
firms. More specifically, we present strong evidence that the associations of entrepreneurial 
firms with venture capitalists and investment banks not only have implications during the early 
years of the firm’s establishment, growth, and even transition into publicly-traded organizations, 
but such relationships can have far-reaching consequences in other market settings such as the 
M&A context. These signals also appear to have substitute effects on the likelihood of 
acquisition.  Finally, while IPO pricing and the operation of equity markets also appear to shape   24
the probability of acquisitions of these firms, these effects are considerably more circumscribed 
in time by comparison.  At the broadest level, the study’s findings therefore suggest that the 
choices entrepreneurial firms have in one market or decision-making context (e.g., raising 
venture capital or public equity) can have important implications in other market situations, 
which might not appear to be related at first blush.   
For researchers, these findings suggest that studies need to begin to examine how 
information produced in one market can effect firm behavior and outcomes in other markets.  
Prior studies have considered the implications of IPOs for competitive strategy and product 
market competition (e.g., Demers & Lewellen, 2003), yet have not examined the effects of IPOs 
for factor markets and the market for corporate resources.  Scholars in strategy and 
entrepreneurship have typically considered IPOs as a natural end-state for entrepreneurial firms, 
or have ignored IPOs in studies of other corporate strategy phenomena, thereby implicitly 
assuming that going-public decisions are independent, financing choices.  However, our findings 
indicate that the operation of the IPO market has important consequences for the operation of 
M&A markets, and that IPOs might be considered in strategic, as opposed to purely financial, 
terms as they affect the subsequent evolution of companies and their corporate development 
activities. 
This set of results is particularly salient when examined from the perspective of 
entrepreneurial firms and the difficulties they face in accessing complementary resources, or 
exiting, due to the asymmetries in information across these firms and prospective exchange 
partners. As in other markets, asymmetric information in M&A markets can give rise to 
inefficiencies that can ultimately hinder the entrepreneurial firm’s ability to obtain needed inputs 
and grow.  From this vantage point, our findings highlight a number of signaling opportunities   25
that entrepreneurs might consider.  Although our study focuses on post-IPO acquisitions as an 
extreme case of assembling resources under information asymmetries, extensions to other 
corporate domains might also be useful in considering this more generic problem. For example, 
it would be worthwhile to investigate the information spillover effects of initial public offerings 
on the likelihood of establishment of alliances or other ties between firms such as buyer-supplier 
relationships.  It would also be valuable to consider other resource providers such as investors 
and examine how initial public offerings affect the availability or terms of other types of funding 
after a firm has transitioned to public status. 
From the standpoint of acquiring firms, our results demonstrate the value of signals to 
mitigate the effects of asymmetric information. Although much research has been devoted to 
direct remedies that acquirers might utilize to reduce the overpayment risk in M&A, such as 
using stock or other contingent payments as currency for the exchange (e.g., Hansen, 1987; 
Datar, Frankel, & Wolfson, 2001), comparatively little work has explored the role of potential 
signals such as those we have studied in facilitating acquisition transactions.  It is also worth 
underscoring that analytical and empirical work tends to examine one remedy in isolation, and 
we have presented evidence that signals can substitute for one another.  It would therefore be 
interesting to examine simultaneously the full gamut of potential solutions to this problem, 
including trust, pre-acquisition collaborations, contractual remedies, various signals, etc., or at 
least to begin to consider multiple alternatives at once to examine how the substitute or 
complement one another.  Given that acquirers and sellers have many ways of addressing this 
problem, and these alternatives likely differ in their cost and effectiveness in different settings, 
theory and evidence are needed to explain when firms might choose one solution over another. 
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Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This paper’s broad objective was to bring theory and some preliminary evidence of the 
relevance of IPOs to the subsequent evolution of newly-public firms. In addition to some of the 
research possibilities presented above, we believe that there are a number of opportunities to 
extend this work as well as address some of its limitations.  First, our focus is exclusively on the 
incidence of post-IPO acquisitions, but we do not examine the performance implications of deals 
that follow initial public offerings.  It would be interesting to examine whether the signals sent 
during IPOs have a material impact on the success of acquisitions in general or the risk of 
overpayment in particular.  Analysis of performance data would also permit investigation of the 
extent to which entrepreneurial firms benefit from incurring the costs needed to signal their 
quality.  Although direct cost data might be difficult to obtain for the various signaling 
investments by firms, the performance implications of signals for acquisitions of entrepreneurial 
firms might be examined by investigating acquisition premia. 
Second, it might be worthwhile to explore several contingencies that have received 
attention in the M&A literature such as the level of ownership, relatedness, etc. as the dynamics 
we have documented for acquisitions may play out quite differently for various types of 
acquirers or deal structures.  For instance, adverse selection concerns, and hence the value of 
signals, are apt to be greater for full acquisitions compared to others involving more modest 
ownership stakes.  They are also apt to be greater for deals in which firms operate in very 
different industries and therefore have little familiarity with each others’ resources and strategies 
compared to highly related deals.  There are undoubtedly opportunities to probe the 
generalizability of our findings in other directions, for instance by considering IPOs and 
acquisitions in different institutional contexts outside the US, by examining the going public   27
event for larger or more established firms, or by investigating the implications of initial public 
offerings of divisions of companies as opposed to stand-alone firms (i.e., equity carveouts).  
Finally, it is worth noting that we have not assumed that entrepreneurial firms 
intentionally associate with particular venture capitalists or underwriters in order to sell their 
firms as these various decisions involve multiple considerations as well as separation in time.  
However, it would be desirable to conduct research using primary data in order to assess sources 
of heterogeneity that are difficult to examine with secondary information, such as entrepreneurial 
firms’ motives for working with particular VCs or underwriters, going public, or being acquired.  
Such research could also examine in more fine-grained terms the different interests and influence 
of agents involved in these decisions, including founders, other managers, venture capitalists, 
and so forth (e.g., Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004).  For instance, in some IPOs or acquisitions, 
entrepreneurs or VCs retain ownership after the deal is consummated, while in others they may 
remain as decision makers or depart altogether. Clearly, each of these scenarios creates a 
different set of incentives for entrepreneurs to misrepresent the value of their firms and for 
prospective acquirers to take steps to address the risk of adverse selection.  Extensions that 
address these issues concerning M&A performance, heterogeneity in firms and acquisition, and 
more micro features of such processes would be quite valuable.  More broadly, our hope is that 
the study offers a first step that encourages additional work to take up some of the strategic and 
organizational implications of entrepreneurial firms’ initial public offerings. 
 
   28
REFERENCES 
Acs, Z. J., & Audretsch, D. B. 1987. Innovation, market structure, and firm size. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 69: 567-574. 
 
Aggarwal, R. K., Krigman, L., & Womack, K. L. 2002. Strategic IPO underpricing, information 
momentum, and lockup expiration selling. Journal of Financial Economics, 66: 105-
137. 
 
Akerlof, G. A. 1970. The market for 'lemons': Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84: 488-500. 
 
Allen, F., & Faulhaber, G. R. 1989. Signaling by underpricing in the IPO market. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 23: 303-323.  
 
Amit, R., Glosten, L., & Muller, E. 1990. Entrepreneurial ability, venture investments, and risk 
sharing. Management Science, 38: 1232-45. 
 
Arrow, K. J. 1974. The limits of organization. New York; W. W. Norton. 
 
Audretsch, D. B. 2002. The dynamic role of small firms: Evidence from the U.S. Small Business 
Economics, 18: 13-40. 
 
Barzel, Y. 1987. The entrepreneur’s reward for self-policing. Economic Inquiry, 25: 103-116. 
 
Baum, J. T. 1996. Organization ecology, in Clegg, S., Hardy, C., & Nord, W. (eds), Handbook 
of Organizational Studies, London: Sage, 77-114. 
 
Beatty, R., & Ritter, J. R. 1986. Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of initial 
public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 15: 213-232. 
 
Belsey, D. A., Kuh, E., & Welsch, R. E. 1980. Regression diagnostics: Identifying influential 
data and sources of collinearity. Wiley, John & Sons, Inc. 
 
Brau, J. C., & Kohers, N. 2005. Dual Track IPOs versus Single Track Takeovers:   
  Does the Road Less Traveled Make all the Difference? Working paper. 
  
Brav, A., & Gompers, P. A. 1997. Myth or reality? The long-run underperformance of initial 
public offerings: Evidence from venture and nonventure capital-backed companies. 
Journal of Finance, 52, 1791-1821. 
 
Carter, R. B., Dark, R. H., & Singh, A. K. 1998. Underwriter reputation, initial returns, and the 
long-run performance of IPO stocks. Journal of Finance, 53: 285-311. 
 
Carter, R., & Manaster, S. 1990. Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation. Journal of 
Finance, 45: 1045-1067.   29
 
Casson, M. 1995. Entrepreneurship and business culture. Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, US: 
Edward Elgar. 
 
Chung, K. H., & Pruitt, S. W. 1994. A simple approximation of Tobin's q. Financial 
Management, 23: 70-74. 
 
Cooper, A., Dunkelberg, W., & Woo, C. 1988. Survival and failure: A longitudinal study, in 
Kirchhoff, B., Long, W., McMullan, W., Vesper, K., & Wetzel, W. (eds), Frontiers of 
Entrepreneurship Research. Babson Park, US: Babson College, pp. 225-237. 
 
Cox, D. R. 1972. Regression models and life tables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 34: 
1987-220. 
 
Datar, S., Frankel, R. & Wolfson, M. 2001. Earnouts: The effects of adverse selection and 
agency costs on acquisition techniques. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 
17: 201-238. 
 
Delacroix, J., & Swaminathan, A. 1991. Cosmetic, speculative, and adaptive organization change 
in the wine industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26: 631-661. 
 
Demers, E., & Lewellen, K. 2003. The marketing role of IPOs: Evidence from internet stocks. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 68: 413-437. 
 
Draho, J. 2004. The IPO decision: Why and how companies go public. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Dunbar, C. G. Factors affecting investment bank initial public offering market share. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 55: 3-41. 
 
Eckbo, B. E., Giammarino, R. M., & Heinkel, R. L. 1990. Asymmetric information and the 
medium of exchange in takeovers: Theory and tests. Review of Financial Studies, 3: 
651-675. 
 
Field, L. C., & Karpoff, J. M. 2002. Takeover defenses of IPO firms. Journal of Finance, 57: 
1857-1889. 
 
Fishman, M. J. 1989. Preemptive bidding and the role of the medium of exchange in 
acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 44: 41-57. 
 
Garmaise, M. J., & Moskowitz, T. J. 2004. Confronting information asymmetries: Evidence from 
real estate markets. Review of Financial Studies, 17: 405-437. 
 
Gompers, P. 1996. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 42: 133-156. 
   30
Graebner, M. E., & Eisenhardt, K. M. 2004. The seller’s side of the story: Acquisition as 
courtship and governance as syndicate in entrepreneurial firms. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 49: 366-403. 
 
Greene, W. H. 1997. Econometric analysis (Third Ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Gulati, R., & Higgins, M. C. 2003. Which ties matter when? The contingent effects of 
interorganizational partnerships on IPO success. Strategic Management Journal, 24: 
127-144. 
 
Hambrick, D.C., MacMillan, I. C., and Day, D.L. 1982. Strategic attributes and performance in 
the BCG Matrix: A PIMS-based analysis of industrial product businesses. Academy of 
Management Journal 25: 510-531. 
 
Hansen, R. G. 1987. A theory for the choice of exchange medium in mergers and acquisitions. 
Journal of Business, 60: 75-95. 
 
Hibbard, J. 2004. How to drive suitors wild. BusinessWeek, (August 2): 74. 
 
Higgins, M. C., & Gulati, R. 2003. Getting off to a good start: The effects of upper echelon 
affiliations on underwriter prestige. Organization Science, 14: 244-264. 
 
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. 1993. Market liquidity and performance monitoring. Journal of 
Political Economy, 101: 678-709. 
 
Hulburt, H. M., & Scherr, F. C. 2003. Determinants of the collateralization of credit by small 
firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 24: 483-501. 
 
Ibbotson, R. G. 1975. Price performance of common stock new issues. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 22: 235-272. 
 
Ibbotson, R. G., Ritter, J. R., & Sindelar, J. L. 1994. The market’s problems with the pricing of 
initial public offerings. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7: 66-74. 
 
Jain, B. A., & Kini, O. 1995. Venture capitalist participation and the post-issue operating 
performance of IPO firms. Managerial and Decision Economics, 16, 593-606. 
 
Jenkinson, T., & Ljungqvist, A. 2001. Going public: The theory and evidence on how 
companies raise equity finance (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kaplan, S. N., & Weisbach, M. S. 1992. The success of acquisitions: Evidence from divestitures. 
Journal of Finance, 47: 107-138. 
 
Kohers, N., & Ang, J. 2000. Earnouts in mergers: Agreeing to disagree and agreeing to stay. 
Journal of Business 73: 445-476. 
   31
Krigman, L., Shaw, W. H., & Womack, K. L. 2001. Why do firms switch underwriters? Journal 
of Financial Economics, 60: 245-284. 
 
Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. 2002. Why don't issuers get upset about leaving money on the table 
in IPOs? Review of Financial Studies, 15: 413-443. 
 
Loughran, T., & Ritter, J. R. 2004. Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? Financial 
Management, 33: 5-37. 
 
McGahan, A. M. 1999. The performance of US corporations: 1981-1994. Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 47: 373-398. 
 
Megginson, W. L., & Weiss, K. A. 1991. Venture capitalist certification in initial public 
offerings. Journal of Finance, 46: 879-903. 
 
Mikkelson, W. H., Partch, M. M., & Shah, K. 1997. Ownership and operating performance of 
companies that go public. Journal of Financial Economics, 44: 281-307. 
 
Milgrom, P., & Stokey, N. 1982. Information, trade and common knowledge. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 26: 17-27. 
 
Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. 1985. Applied linear statistical models (Second 
Edition). Homewood, IL: Irwin. 
 
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., & Zingales, L. 1998. Why do companies go public? An empirical 
analysis. Journal of Finance, 53: 27-64. 
Podolny, J. M. 1993. A status-based model of market competition. American Journal of 
Sociology, 98: 829-872. 
Pollock, T. 2004. The benefits and costs of underwriters’ social capital in the US initial public 
offerings market. Strategic Organization, 2: 357-388. 
 
Riley, J. C. 2001. Silver signals: Twenty-five years of screening and signaling. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 39: 432-478. 
Scherer, F. M., & Ross, D. 1990. Industrial market structure and economic performance 
(Third Edition). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
Shane, S., & Cable, D. 2002. Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new ventures. 
Management Science, 48: 364-381.  
Shane, S., & Stuart, T. 2002. Organizational endowments and the performance of university 
start-ups. Management Science, 48: 154-170. 
Spence, A. M. 1974. Market signaling. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
   32
Stiglitz, J. E. 2000. The contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century 
economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 1441-1478. 
 
Villalonga B. 2004. Intangibles resources, Tobin’s Q, and the sustainability of performance 
differences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 54: 205-230. 
Welch, I. 1989. Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and the underpricing of initial public 
offerings. Journal of Finance, 44: 421-449. 
 
   33
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
a 
 
Variable Mean  S.D.  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1.   M&A event  0.18 0.38  ---                 
2.   Target IPO venture-backed  0.47 0.50 0.17
*** ---             
3.   Target IPO IB reputation  6.22 2.69 0.16
*** 0.44
*** ---           
4.   Target IPO underpricing  0.27 0.56 0.03 0.14
*** 0.18
*** ---           
5.   Target IPO major exchange  0.75 0.43 0.13
*** 0.23
*** 0.45
*** 0.11
*** ---        
6.   Size 
b  3.35 1.25 0.12
*** 0.27
*** 0.68
*** 0.23
*** 0.45
*** ---     
7.   Leverage  0.32 0.28  -0.03  -0.22
*** -0.14
*** -0.13
*** -0.15
*** -0.06
* ---     
8.   Market-to-book   4.99 8.01 0.01 0.17
*** 0.19
*** 0.59
*** 0.09
*** 0.15
*** -0.10
*** ---  
9.   High-tech industry  0.37 0.48 0.11
*** 0.22
*** 0.18
*** 0.27
*** 0.13
*** 0.14
*** -0.10
*** 0.26
*** --- 
10. IPO volume   587.20 183.36  0.03  -0.03  -0.04  -0.12
*** -0.03 -0.11
*** -0.003 -0.10
*** -0.001 
a N=1287. 
†  p<0.10, 
* p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. 
b This variable was logged for the model estimation to remedy skewness  34
 
TABLE 2 
Entrepreneurial Firms’ Characteristics and Acquisition Timing  
 
 
Acquisition timing 
(years)  N  IPO venture-
backed 
IPO IB 
reputation 
IPO 
underpricing 
≤ 1  26  0.85  8.08  0.81 
> 1, ≤ 2  64  0.63  6.94  0.23 
> 2 , ≤ 3   54  0.57  7.00  0.25 
> 3 , ≤ 4   54  0.70  7.17  0.25 
> 4 , ≤ 5   34  0.62  7.12  0.27 
Total acquired (I) 232  0.66  7.16  0.31 
Total not acquired (II) 1055  0.43  6.02  0.26 
T-test (I-II)     7.10
*** 1.10 
χ
 2 
(I-II)   37.93
***      35
TABLE 3 
Cox Regression Results 
c 
 
Independent variables  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V) 
  Target IPO venture-backed  ---  0.56
*** 
(0.16) 
0.56
*** 
(0.15) 
1.75
*** 
(0.45) 
1.59
** 
(0.49) 
  Target IPO IB reputation  ---  0.08
† 
(0.04) 
0.60
** 
(0.19) 
0.16
** 
(0.05) 
0.57
** 
(0.19) 
  Target IPO IB reputation 
^ 2 --- ---  -0.05
** 
(0.02)  ---  -0.04
* 
(0.02) 
  Target IPO VC-backed *  
 IB  reputation  --- --- ---  -0.17
** 
(0.06) 
-0.15
† 
(0.07) 
  Target IPO underpricing  ---  0.06 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.11 
(0.13) 
  Target IPO major exchange   0.64
** 
(0.21) 
0.49
* 
(0.22) 
0.42
† 
(0.22) 
0.52
* 
(0.22) 
0.45
* 
(0.22) 
 Size 
d  0.16
** 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
 Leverage  -0.04 
(0.26) 
0.23 
(0.25) 
-0.25 
(0.25) 
0.24 
(0.25) 
0.25 
(0.25) 
 Market-to-book    -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 High-tech  industry  0.47
*** 
(0.14) 
0.36
** 
(0.14) 
0.36
* 
(0.14) 
0.36
** 
(0.14) 
0.35
* 
(0.14) 
  IPO volume ( 
^10
–2 )  0.06
† 
(0.04) 
0.07
† 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
χ
 2 46.10
*** 70.86
*** 79.42
*** 78.44
*** 84.04
*** 
Log Likelihood, L(β)  -1603.41 -1591.04 -1586.75 -1587.24 -1584.45 
-2[L(βbaseline)-L(βi)]~χ 
2  --- 24.75
*** 33.32
*** 32.34
*** 37.94
*** 
c N=1287. 
†  p<0.10, 
* p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. 
d This variable was logged for the model estimation to remedy skewness 